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The Dodd-Frank Act
International Association of Risk and Compliance Professionals (IARCP)
 
Read the Dodd-Frank Act - The text of the Dodd-Frank Act in an easy to read format
 
More about the Dodd-Frank Act for nonbank financial companies, foreign companies and foreign banks: www.dodd-frank-act.org

More about the Volcker Rule: www.volcker-rule.us
 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act, Dodd-Frank bill, or Dodd-Frank financial regulatory reform bill, was named after its two chief authors, Sen. Chris Dodd (D., Conn.) and Rep. Barney Frank (D., Mass.).
 
In order to understand fully the reform, we need to study 2000+ pages. This is a "too big to read" Act, but it tries to solve the "too big to fail" problem, along with other weaknesses in the system. Forget the easy Acts like the Glass Steagall Act which was 34 pages long.

The full title of the Dodd Frank Act: An Act to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end "too big to fail", to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.

Enacted by the 111th United States Congress.



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"We welcome the strong financial regulatory reform bill in the United States"
THE G-20 TORONTO SUMMIT, DECLARATION, June 26 – 27, 2010

 
The financial crisis has imposed huge costs. This must not be allowed to happen again.
 
The recent financial volatility has strengthened our resolve to work together to complete financial repair and reform.
 
We need to build a more resilient financial system that serves the needs of our economies, reduces moral hazard, limits the build-up of systemic risk and supports strong and stable economic growth.

Collectively we have made considerable progress toward strengthening the global financial system by fortifying prudential oversight, improving risk management, promoting transparency and continuously reinforcing international cooperation.
 
We welcome the strong financial regulatory reform bill in the United States.
 
We agreed that the core of the financial sector reform agenda rests on improving the strength of capital and liquidity and discouraging excessive leverage.
 
We agreed to increase the quality, quantity, and international consistency of capital, to strengthen liquidity standards, to discourage excessive leverage and risk taking, and reduce procyclicality.

We took stock of the progress of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) towards a new global regime for bank capital and liquidity and we welcome and support its work.
 
Substantial progress has been made on reforms that will materially raise levels of resilience of our banking systems.

The amount of capital will be significantly higher when the new reforms are fully implemented.

The quality of capital will be significantly improved to reinforce banks’ ability to absorb losses 
 


The Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) issued the following statement

“After great debate, we have produced a strong Wall Street reform bill that will fundamentally change the way our financial services sector is regulated.”

“Over the past two years, America has faced the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Millions of Americans have lost their homes, their jobs, their savings and their faith in our economy.”

“The American people have called on us to set clear rules of the road for the financial industry to prevent a repeat of the financial collapse that cost so many so dearly.”

“This bill meets that challenge.”

“We have succeeded in creating an office to ensure American consumers get the clear, accurate information they need to shop for mortgages, credit cards, and other financial products, and protect them from hidden fees, abusive terms, and deceptive practices.”

“We found a way to end too big to fail bailouts, ensuring that no financial institution will ever be capable of bringing down the economy.”

“We closed loopholes in regulations and required greater transparency and accountability for over-the-counter derivatives, asset backed securities, hedge funds, mortgage brokers and payday lenders.”

“I am proud of this bill, and I am proud of the open and transparent process that led to such a successful result.”
 

 
Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation
INTRODUCTION


Over the past two years we have faced the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression.
 
Americans across the nation are struggling with unemployment, failing businesses, falling home prices, and declining savings.
 
These challenges have forced the government to take extraordinary measures to revive our financial system so that people can access loans to buy a car or home, pay for a child’s education, or finance a business.

The roots of this crisis go back decades. Years without a serious economic recession bred complacency among financial intermediaries and investors.
 
Financial challenges such as the near-failure of Long-Term Capital Management and the Asian Financial Crisis had minimal impact on economic growth in the U.S., which bred exaggerated expectations about the resilience of our financial markets and firms.
 
Rising asset prices, particularly in housing, hid weak credit underwriting standards and masked the growing leverage throughout the system.

At some of our most sophisticated financial firms, risk management systems did not keep pace with the complexity of new financial products.
 
The lack of transparency and standards in markets for securitized loans helped to weaken underwriting standards.

Market discipline broke down as investors relied excessively on credit rating agencies.

Compensation practices throughout the financial services industry rewarded short-term profits at the expense of long-term value.

Households saw significant increases in access to credit, but those gains were overshadowed by pervasive failures in consumer protection, leaving many Americans with obligations that they did not understand and could not afford.

While this crisis had many causes, it is clear now that the government could have done more to prevent many of these problems from growing out of control and threatening the stability of our financial system.
 
Gaps and weaknesses in the supervision and regulation of financial firms presented challenges to our government’s ability to monitor, prevent, or address risks as they built up in the system.
 
No regulator saw its job as protecting the economy and financial system as a whole.
 
Existing approaches to bank holding company regulation focused on protecting the subsidiary bank, not on comprehensive regulation of the whole firm.
 
Investment banks were permitted to opt for a different regime under a different regulator, and in doing so, escaped adequate constraints on leverage.
 
Other firms, such as AIG, owned insured depositories, but escaped the strictures of serious holding company regulation because the depositories that they owned were technically not “banks” under relevant law.

We must act now to restore confidence in the integrity of our financial system.
 
The lasting economic damage to ordinary families and businesses is a constant reminder of the urgent need to act to reform our financial regulatory system and put our economy on track to a sustainable recovery.
 
We must build a new foundation for financial regulation and supervision that is simpler and more effectively enforced, that protects consumers and investors, that rewards innovation and that is able to adapt and evolve with changes in the financial market.

In the following pages, we propose reforms to meet five key objectives:
 
(1) Promote robust supervision and regulation of financial firms.
 
Financial institutions that are critical to market functioning should be subject to strong oversight.
 
No financial firm that poses a significant risk to the financial system should be unregulated or weakly regulated.
 
We need clear accountability in financial oversight and supervision.
 
We propose:

• A new Financial Services Oversight Council of financial regulators to identify emerging systemic risks and improve interagency cooperation.

• New authority for the Federal Reserve to supervise all firms that could pose a threat to financial stability, even those that do not own banks.

• Stronger capital and other prudential standards for all financial firms, and even higher standards for large, interconnected firms.

• A new National Bank Supervisor to supervise all federally chartered banks.

• Elimination of the federal thrift charter and other loopholes that allowed some depository institutions to avoid bank holding company regulation by the Federal Reserve

• The registration of advisers of hedge funds and other private pools of capital with the SEC
 
(2) Establish comprehensive supervision of financial markets.
 
Our major financial markets must be strong enough to withstand both system-wide stress and the failure of one or more large institutions.
 
We propose:

• Enhanced regulation of securitization markets, including new requirements for market transparency, stronger regulation of credit rating agencies, and a requirement that issuers and originators retain a financial interest in securitized loans.

• Comprehensive regulation of all over-the-counter derivatives.

• New authority for the Federal Reserve to oversee payment, clearing, and settlement systems.
 
(3) Protect consumers and investors from financial abuse.
 
To rebuild trust in our markets, we need strong and consistent regulation and supervision of consumer financial services and investment markets.
 
We should base this oversight not on speculation or abstract models, but on actual data about how people make financial decisions.
 
We must promote transparency, simplicity, fairness, accountability, and access.
 
We propose:

• A new Consumer Financial Protection Agency to protect consumers across the financial sector from unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices.

• Stronger regulations to improve the transparency, fairness, and appropriateness of consumer and investor products and services.

• A level playing field and higher standards for providers of consumer financial products and services, whether or not they are part of a bank.
 
(4) Provide the government with the tools it needs to manage financial crises.
 
We need to be sure that the government has the tools it needs to manage crises, if and when they arise, so that we are not left with untenable choices between bailouts and financial collapse.
 
We propose:

• A new regime to resolve nonbank financial institutions whose failure could have serious systemic effects.

• Revisions to the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authority to improve accountability.
 
(5) Raise international regulatory standards and improve international cooperation.

The challenges we face are not just American challenges, they are global challenges.
 
So, as we work to set high regulatory standards here in the United States, we must ask the world to do the same.
 
We propose:

• International reforms to support our efforts at home, including strengthening the capital framework; improving oversight of global financial markets; coordinating supervision of internationally active firms; and enhancing crisis management tools.

In addition to substantive reforms of the authorities and practices of regulation and supervision, the proposals contained in this report entail a significant restructuring of our regulatory system.
 
We propose the creation of a Financial Services Oversight Council, chaired by Treasury and including the heads of the principal federal financial regulators as members.
 
We also propose the creation of two new agencies.
 
We propose the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, which will be an independent entity dedicated to consumer protection in credit, savings, and payments markets.
 
We also propose the creation of the National Bank Supervisor, which will be a single agency with separate status in Treasury with responsibility for federally chartered depository institutions.
 
To promote national coordination in the insurance sector, we propose the creation of an Office of National Insurance within Treasury.

Under our proposal, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) would maintain their respective roles in the supervision and regulation of state chartered banks, and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) would maintain its authorities with regard to credit unions.
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) would maintain their current responsibilities and authorities as market regulators, though we propose to harmonize the statutory and regulatory frameworks for futures and securities.

The proposals contained in this report do not represent the complete set of potentially desirable reforms in financial regulation.
 
More can and should be done in the future.
 
We focus here on what is essential: to address the causes of the current crisis, to create a more stable financial system that is fair for consumers, and to help prevent and contain potential crises in the future.
 

 
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE LEGISLATION
 
STRONG CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION WATCHDOG
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau


Independent Head:
Led by an independent director appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Independent Budget:
Dedicated budget paid by the Federal Reserve system.

Independent Rule Writing:
Able to autonomously write rules for consumer protections governing all financial institutions – banks and non-banks – offering consumer financial services or products.

Examination and Enforcement:
Authority to examine and enforce regulations for banks and credit unions with assets of over $10 billion and all mortgage-related businesses (lenders, servicers, mortgage brokers, and foreclosure scam operators), payday lenders, and student lenders as well as other non-bank financial companies that are large, such as debt collectors and consumer reporting agencies. Banks and Credit Unions with assets of $10 billion or less will be examined for consumer complaints by the appropriate regulator.

Consumer Protections:
Consolidates and strengthens consumer protection responsibilities currently handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Federal Trade Commission. Will also oversee the enforcement of federal laws intended to ensure the fair, equitable and nondiscriminatory access to credit for individuals and communities.

Able to Act Fast:
With this Bureau on the lookout for bad deals and schemes, consumers won’t have to wait for Congress to pass a law to be protected from bad business practices.

Educates:
Creates a new Office of Financial Literacy.

Consumer Hotline:
Creates a national consumer complaint hotline so consumers will have, for the first time, a single toll-free number to report problems with financial products and services.

Accountability:
Makes one office accountable for consumer protections. With many agencies sharing responsibility, it’s hard to know who is responsible for what, and easy for emerging problems that haven’t historically fallen under anyone’s purview, to fall through the cracks.

Works with Bank Regulators:
Coordinates with other regulators when examining banks to prevent undue regulatory burden. Consults with regulators before a proposal is issued and regulators could appeal regulations they believe would put the safety and soundness of the banking system or the stability of the financial system at risk.

Clearly Defined Oversight:
Protects small business from unintentionally being regulated by the CFPB, excluding businesses that meet certain standards.
 
LOOKING OUT FOR THE NEXT BIG PROBLEM: ADDRESSING SYSTEMIC RISKS
The Financial Stability Oversight Council


Expert Members:
Made up of 10 federal financial regulators and an independent member and 5 nonvoting members, the Financial Stability Oversight Council will be charged with identifying and responding to emerging risks throughout the financial system. The Council will be chaired by the Treasury Secretary and include the Federal Reserve Board, SEC, CFTC, OCC, FDIC, FHFA, NCUA and the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The 5 nonvoting members include OFR, FIO, and state banking, insurance, and securities regulators.

Tough to Get Too Big:
Makes recommendations to the Federal Reserve for increasingly strict rules for capital, leverage, liquidity, risk management and other requirements as companies grow in size and complexity, with significant requirements on companies that pose risks to the financial system.

Regulates Nonbank Financial Companies:
Authorized to require, with a 2/3 vote, that a nonbank financial company be regulated by the Federal Reserve if the council believe there would be negative effects on the financial system if the company failed or its activities would pose a risk to the financial stability of the US.

Break Up Large, Complex Companies:
Able to approve, with a 2/3 vote, a Federal Reserve decision to require a large, complex company, to divest some of its holdings if it poses a grave threat to the financial stability of the United States – but only as a last resort.

Technical Expertise:
Creates a new Office of Financial Research within Treasury to be staffed with a highly sophisticated staff of economists, accountants, lawyers, former supervisors, and other specialists to support the council’s work by collecting financial data and conducting economic analysis.

Make Risks Transparent:
Through the Office of Financial Research and member agencies the council will collect and analyze data to identify and monitor emerging risks to the economy and make this information public in periodic reports and testimony to Congress every year.

No Evasion:
Large bank holding companies that have received TARP funds will not be able to avoid Federal Reserve supervision by simply dropping their banks. (the “Hotel California” provision)

Capital Standards:
Establishes a floor for capital that cannot be lower than the standards in effect today.
 
ENDING TOO BIG TO FAIL BAILOUTS
Limiting Large, Complex Financial Companies and Preventing Future Bailouts


No Taxpayer Funded Bailouts:
Clearly states taxpayers will not be on the hook to save a failing financial company or to cover the cost of its liquidation.

Discourage Excessive Growth & Complexity:
The Financial Stability Oversight Council will monitor systemic risk and make recommendations to the Federal Reserve for increasingly strict rules for capital, leverage, liquidity, risk management and other requirements as companies grow in size and complexity, with significant requirements on companies that pose risks to the financial system.

Volcker Rule:
Requires regulators implement regulations for banks, their affiliates and holding companies, to prohibit proprietary trading, investment in and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds, and to limit relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds. Nonbank financial institutions supervised by the Fed will also have restrictions on proprietary trading and hedge fund and private equity investments. The Council will study and make recommendations on implementation to aid regulators.

Extends Regulation:
The Council will have the ability to require nonbank financial companies that pose a risk to the financial stability of the United States to submit to supervision by the Federal Reserve.

Payment, clearing, and settlement regulation.
Provides a specific framework for promoting uniform risk-management standards for systemically important financial market utilities and systemically important payment, clearing, and settlement activities conducted by financial institutions.

Funeral Plans:
Requires large, complex financial companies to periodically submit plans for their rapid and orderly shutdown should the company go under. Companies will be hit with higher capital requirements and restrictions on growth and activity, as well as divestment, if they fail to submit acceptable plans. Plans will help regulators understand the structure of the companies they oversee and serve as a roadmap for shutting them down if the company fails. Significant costs for failing to produce a credible plan create incentives for firms to rationalize structures or operations that cannot be unwound easily.

Liquidation:
Creates an orderly liquidation mechanism for FDIC to unwind failing systemically significant financial companies. Shareholders and unsecured creditors bear losses and management and culpable directors will be removed.

Liquidation Procedure:
Requires that Treasury, FDIC and the Federal Reserve all agree to put a company into the orderly liquidation process because its failure or resolution in bankruptcy would have adverse effects on financial stability, with an up front judicial review.

Costs to Financial Firms, Not Taxpayers:
Taxpayers will bear no cost for liquidating large, interconnected financial companies. FDIC can borrow only the amount of funds to liquidate a company that it expects to be repaid from the assets of the company being liquidated. The government will be first in line for repayment. Funds not repaid from the sale of the company’s assets will be repaid first through the claw back of any payments to creditors that exceeded liquidation value and then assessments on large financial companies, with the riskiest paying more based on considerations included in a risk matrix

Federal Reserve Emergency Lending:
Significantly alters the Federal Reserve’s 13(3) emergency lending authority to prohibit bailing out an individual company. Secretary of the Treasury must approve any lending program, and such programs must be broad based and not aid a failing financial company. Collateral must be sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses.

Bankruptcy:
Most large financial companies that fail are expected to be resolved through the bankruptcy process.

Limits on Debt Guarantees:
To prevent bank runs, the FDIC can guarantee debt of solvent insured banks, but only after meeting serious requirements: 2/3 majority of the Board and the FDIC board must determine there is a threat to financial stability; the Treasury Secretary approves terms and conditions and sets a cap on overall guarantee amounts; the President activates an expedited process for Congressional approval.
 
REFORMING THE FEDERAL RESERVE

Federal Reserve Emergency Lending:
Limits the Federal Reserve’s 13(3) emergency lending authority by prohibiting emergency lending to an individual entity. Secretary of the Treasury must approve any lending program, programs must be broad based, and loans cannot be made to insolvent firms. Collateral must be sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses.

Audit of the Federal Reserve:
GAO will conduct a one-time audit of all Federal Reserve 13(3) emergency lending that took place during the financial crisis. Details on all lending will be published on the Federal Reserve website by December 1, 2010. In the future GAO will have authority to audit 13(3) and discount window lending, and open market transactions.

Transparency - Disclosure:
Requires the Federal Reserve to disclose counterparties and information about amounts, terms and conditions of 13(3) and discount window lending, and open market transactions on an on-going basis, with specified time delays.

Supervisory Accountability:
Creates a Vice Chairman for Supervision, a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve designated by the President, who will develop policy recommendations regarding supervision and regulation for the Board, and will report to Congress semi-annually on Board supervision and regulation efforts.

Federal Reserve Bank Governance:
GAO will conduct a study of the current system for appointing Federal Reserve Bank directors, to examine whether the current system effectively represents the public, and whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest. It will also examine the establishment and operation of emergency lending facilities during the crisis and the Federal Reserve banks involved therein. The GAO will identify measures that would improve reserve bank governance.

Election of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents:
Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks will be elected by class B directors - elected by district member banks to represent the public - and class C directors - appointed by the Board of Governors to represent the public. Class A directors - elected by member banks to represent member banks – will no longer vote for presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks.

Limits on Debt Guarantees:
To prevent bank runs, the FDIC can guarantee debt of solvent insured banks, but only after meeting serious requirements: 2/3 majority of the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC board determine there is a threat to financial stability; the Treasury Secretary approves terms and conditions and sets a cap on overall guarantee amounts; the President initiates an expedited process for Congressional approval.
 
CREATING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR DERIVATIVES
Bringing Transparency and Accountability to the Derivatives Market


Closes Regulatory Gaps:
Provides the SEC and CFTC with authority to regulate over-the-counter derivatives so that irresponsible practices and excessive risk-taking can no longer escape regulatory oversight.

Central Clearing and Exchange Trading:
Requires central clearing and exchange trading for derivatives that can be cleared and provides a role for both regulators and clearing houses to determine which contracts should be cleared. Requires the SEC and the CFTC to pre-approve contracts before clearing houses can clear them.

Market Transparency:
Requires data collection and publication through clearing houses or swap repositories to improve market transparency and provide regulators important tools for monitoring and responding to risks.

Regulates Foreign Exchange Transactions:
Foreign exchange swaps will be regulated like all other Wall Street contracts. At $60 trillion, this is the second largest component of the swaps market and must be regulated.

Increases Enforcement Authority to Punish Bad Behavior:
Regulators will be given broad enforcement authority to punish bad actors that knowingly help clients defraud third parties or the public such as when Wall Street helped Greece use swaps to hide the true state of the country’s finances and doubles penalties for evading the clearing requirement.

Higher standard of conduct:
Establishes a code of conduct for all registered swap dealers and major swap participants when advising a swap entity. When acting as counterparties to a pension fund, endowment fund, or state or local government, dealers are to have a reasonable basis to believe that the fund or governmental entity has an independent representative advising them.
 
NEW OFFICES OF MINORITY AND WOMEN INCLUSION

At federal banking and securities regulatory agencies, the bill establishes an Office of Minority and Women Inclusion that will, among other things, address employment and contracting diversity matters. The offices will coordinate technical assistance to minority-owned and women-owned businesses and seek diversity in the workforce of the regulators.
 
MORTGAGE REFORM

Require Lenders Ensure a Borrower's Ability to Repay:
Establishes a simple federal standard for all home loans: institutions must ensure that borrowers can repay the loans they are sold.

Prohibit Unfair Lending Practices:
Prohibits the financial incentives for subprime loans that encourage lenders to steer borrowers into more costly loans, including the bonuses known as "yield spread premiums" that lenders pay to brokers to inflate the cost of loans. Prohibits pre-payment penalties that trapped so many borrowers into unaffordable loans.

Establishes Penalties for Irresponsible Lending:
Lenders and mortgage brokers who don’t comply with new standards will be held accountable by consumers for as high as three-years of interest payments and damages plus attorney’s fees (if any). Protects borrowers against foreclosure for violations of these standards.

Expands Consumer Protections for High-Cost Mortgages:
Expands the protections available under federal rules on high-cost loans -- lowering the interest rate and the points and fee triggers that define high cost loans.

Requires Additional Disclosures for Consumers on Mortgages:
Lenders must disclose the maximum a consumer could pay on a variable rate mortgage, with a warning that payments will vary based on interest rate changes.

Housing Counseling:
Establishes an Office of Housing Counseling within HUD to boost homeownership and rental housing counseling.
 
HEDGE FUNDS
Raising Standards and Regulating Hedge Funds

Fills Regulatory Gaps:
Ends the “shadow” financial system by requiring hedge funds and private equity advisors to register with the SEC as investment advisers and provide information about their trades and portfolios necessary to assess systemic risk. This data will be shared with the systemic risk regulator and the SEC will report to Congress annually on how it uses this data to protect investors and market integrity.

Greater State Supervision:
Raises the assets threshold for federal regulation of investment advisers from $30 million to $100 million, a move expected to significantly increase the number of advisors under state supervision. States have proven to be strong regulators in this area and subjecting more entities to state supervision will allow the SEC to focus its resources on newly registered hedge funds.
 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
New Requirements and Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies


New Office, New Focus at SEC:
Creates an Office of Credit Ratings at the SEC with expertise and its own compliance staff and the authority to fine agencies. The SEC is required to examine Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations at least once a year and make key findings public.

Disclosure:
Requires Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations to disclose their methodologies, their use of third parties for due diligence efforts, and their ratings track record.

Independent Information:
Requires agencies to consider information in their ratings that comes to their attention from a source other than the organizations being rated if they find it credible.

Conflicts of Interest:
Prohibits compliance officers from working on ratings, methodologies, or sales; installs a new requirement for NRSROs to conduct a one-year look-back review when an NRSRO employee goes to work for an obligor or underwriter of a security or money market instrument subject to a rating by that NRSRO; and mandates that a report to the SEC when certain employees of the NRSRO go to work for an entity that the NRSRO has rated in the previous twelve months.

Liability:
Investors can bring private rights of action against ratings agencies for a knowing or reckless failure to conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts or to obtain analysis from an independent source. NRSROs will now be subject to “expert liability” with the nullification of Rule 436(g) which provides an exemption for credit ratings provided by NRSROs from being considered a part of the registration statement.

Right to Deregister:
Gives the SEC the authority to deregister an agency for providing bad ratings over time.

Education:
Requires ratings analysts to pass qualifying exams and have continuing education.

Eliminates Many Statutory and Regulatory Requirements to Use NRSRO Ratings:
Reduces over-reliance on ratings and encourages investors to conduct their own analysis.

Independent Boards:
Requires at least half the members of NRSRO boards to be independent, with no financial stake in credit ratings.

Ends Shopping for Ratings:
The SEC shall create a new mechanism to prevent issuers of asset backed-securities from picking the agency they think will give the highest rating, after conducting a study and after submission of the report to Congress.
 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Gives Shareholders a Say on Pay and Creating Greater Accountability


Vote on Executive Pay and Golden Parachutes:
Gives shareholders a say on pay with the right to a non-binding vote on executive pay and golden parachutes. This gives shareholders a powerful opportunity to hold accountable executives of the companies they own, and a chance to disapprove where they see the kind of misguided incentive schemes that threatened individual companies and in turn the broader economy.

Nominating Directors:
Gives the SEC authority to grant shareholders proxy access to nominate directors. This requirement can help shift management’s focus from short-term profits to long-term growth and stability.

Independent Compensation Committees:
Standards for listing on an exchange will require that compensation committees include only independent directors and have authority to hire compensation consultants in order to strengthen their independence from the executives they are rewarding or punishing.

No Compensation for Lies:
Requires that public companies set policies to take back executive compensation if it was based on inaccurate financial statements that don’t comply with accounting standards.

SEC Review:
Directs the SEC to clarify disclosures relating to compensation, including requiring companies to provide charts that compare their executive compensation with stock performance over a five-year period.

Enhanced Compensation Oversight for Financial Industry:
Requires Federal financial regulators to issue and enforce joint compensation rules specifically applicable to financial institutions with a Federal regulator.
 
IMPROVEMENTS TO BANK AND THRIFT REGULATIONS

Volcker Rule Implements a strengthened version of the Volcker rule by not allowing a study of the issue to undermine the prohibition on proprietary trading and investing a banking entity’s own money in hedge funds, with a de minimis exception for funds where the investors require some “skin in the game” by the investment advisor--up to 3% of tier 1 capital in the aggregate

Abolishes the Office of Thrift Supervision:
Shuts down this dysfunctional regulator and transfers authorities mainly to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, but preserves the thrift charter.

Deposit Insurance Reforms:
Permanent increase in deposit insurance for banks, thrifts and credit unions to $250,000, retroactive to January 1, 2008.

Stronger lending limits:
Adds credit exposure from derivative transactions to banks’ lending limits.

Improves supervision of holding company subsidiaries:
Requires the Federal Reserve to examine non-bank subsidiaries that are engaged in activities that the subsidiary bank can do (e.g. mortgage lending) on the same schedule and in the same manner as bank exams, Provides the primary federal bank regulator backup authority if that does not occur.

Intermediate Holding Companies:
Allows use of intermediate holding companies by commercial firms that control grandfathered unitary thrift holding companies to better regulate the financial activities, but not the commercial activities.

Interest on business checking:
Repeals the prohibition on banks paying interest on demand deposits.

Charter Conversions:
Removes a regulatory arbitrage opportunity by prohibiting a bank from converting its charter (unless both the old regulator and new regulator do not object) in order to get out from under an enforcement action.

Establishes New Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion at the federal financial agencies
 
INSURANCE

Federal Insurance Office:
Creates the first ever office in the Federal government focused on insurance. The Office, as established in the Treasury, will gather information about the insurance industry, including access to affordable insurance products by minorities, low- and moderate- income persons and underserved communities. The Office will also monitor the insurance industry for systemic risk purposes.

International Presence:
The Office will serve as a uniform, national voice on insurance matters for the United States on the international stage.

Streamlines regulation of surplus lines insurance and reinsurance through state-based reforms.
 
INTERCHANGE FEES

Protects Small Businesses from Unreasonable Fees: Requires Federal Reserve to issue rules to ensure that fees charged to merchants by credit card companies for credit or debit card transactions are reasonable and proportional to the cost of processing those transactions.
 
CREDIT SCORE PROTECTION

Monitor Personal Financial Rating:
Allows consumers free access to their credit score if their score negatively affects them in a financial transaction or a hiring decision. Gives consumers access to credit score disclosures as part of an adverse action and risk-based pricing notice.
 
SEC AND IMPROVING INVESTOR PROTECTIONS

Fiduciary Duty:
Gives SEC the authority to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers who give investment advice --the advice must be in the best interest of their customers.

Encouraging Whistleblowers:
Creates a program within the SEC to encourage people to report securities violations, creating rewards of up to 30% of funds recovered for information provided.

SEC Management Reform:
Mandates a comprehensive outside consultant study of the SEC, an annual assessment of the SEC’s internal supervisory controls and GAO review of SEC management.

New Advocates for Investors:
Creates the Investment Advisory Committee, a committee of investors to advise the SEC on its regulatory priorities and practices; the Office of Investor Advocate in the SEC, to identify areas where investors have significant problems dealing with the SEC and provide them assistance; and an ombudsman to handle investor complaints.

SEC Funding:
Provides more resources to the chronically underfunded agency to carry out its new duties.
 
SECURITIZATION
Reducing Risks Posed by Securities

Skin in the Game:
Requires companies that sell products like mortgage-backed securities to retain at least 5% of the credit risk, unless the underlying loans meet standards that reduce riskiness. That way if the investment doesn’t pan out, the company that packaged and sold the investment would lose out right along with the people they sold it to.

Better Disclosure:
Requires issuers to disclose more information about the underlying assets and to analyze the quality of the underlying assets.
 
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
Better Oversight of Municipal Securities Industry


Registers Municipal Advisors:
Requires registration of municipal advisors and subjects them rules written by the MSRB and enforced by the SEC.

Puts Investors First on the MSRB Board:
Ensures that at all times, the MSRB must have a majority of independent members, to ensure that the public interest is better protected in the regulation of municipal securities.

Fiduciary Duty:
Imposes a fiduciary duty on advisors to ensure that they adhere to the highest standard of care when advising municipal issuers.
 
TACKLING THE EFFECTS OF THE MORTGAGE CRISIS

Neighborhood Stabilization Program:
Provides $1 billion to States and localities to combat the ugly impact on neighborhood of the foreclosure crisis -- such as falling property values and increased crime - by rehabilitating, redeveloping, and reusing abandoned and foreclosed properties.

Emergency Mortgage Relief:
Building on a successful Pennsylvania program, provides $1 billion for bridge loans to qualified unemployed homeowners with reasonable prospects for reemployment to help cover mortgage payments until they are reemployed.

Foreclosure Legal Assistance.
Authorizes a HUD administered program for making grants to provide foreclosure legal assistance to low- and moderate-income homeowners and tenants related to home ownership preservation, home foreclosure prevention, and tenancy associated with home foreclosure.
 
TRANSPARENCY FOR EXTRACTION INDUSTRY

Public Disclosure:
Requires public disclosure to the SEC of payments made to the U.S. and foreign governments relating to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, and minerals.

SEC Filing Disclosure:
The SEC must require those engaged in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals to include information about payments they or their subsidiaries, partners or affiliates have made to the US or a foreign government for such development in an annual report and post this information online.
Congo Conflict Minerals:

Manufacturers Disclosure:
Requires those who file with the SEC and use minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of Congo in manufacturing to disclose measures taken to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of the materials and the products manufactured.

Illicit Minerals Trade Strategy:
Requires the State Department to submit a strategy to address the illicit minerals trade in the region and a map to address links between conflict minerals and armed groups and establish a baseline against which to judge effectiveness.

Deposit Insurance Reforms:
Permanent increase in deposit insurance for banks, thrifts and credit unions to $250,000, retroactive to January 1, 2008.

Restricts US Funds for Foreign Governments:
Requires the Administration to evaluate proposed loans by the IMF to a middle-income country if that country's public debt exceeds its annual Gross Domestic Product, and oppose loans unlikely to be repaid. 
 

 
         
 
Certified Risk and Compliance Management Professional (CRCMP) -
Distance Learning and Online Certification Program
The Dodd Frank Act is part of this program
 
Certified Information Systems Risk and Compliance Professional (CISRCP) -
Distance Learning and Online Certification Program
 
To learn more:
www.risk-compliance-association.com/Distance_Learning_and_Certification.htm